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A Fine Collection: The Political Budget




With data from 1998 to 2015, we find evidence that before elections Italian mayors
issue fewer tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This provides evidence
that mayors strategically use both tax setting and collection to affect elections.
JEL classification: D72, H26, H71.
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Traffic enforcement tickets are a common source of revenues for local governments. They are
a cheap way to raise funds with no necessity to touch existing tax policies, they are imposed
on subjects who may not be resident (voters) in that particular area. Moreover, traffic
regulations are often set by the same subjects issuing fines, with obvious scope for strategic
behaviour: a speed camera can be easily switched on or off, irregular parking can be enforced
very strictly or very laxly, parking regulations can be changed. Unlike taxes (such as property
tax) or service charges (such as nursery school fees) traffic fines have further advantages: they
are (mostly) unrelated to any “service” provided by the local government, have a near-zero
marginal cost, and are issued to subjects who have breached a law or regulation, something
that can be felt as “wrong”, and that is generally avoidable. All these elements make traffic
fines a very flexible and interesting policy instrument.
In Italy municipal governments issue about 20 million tickets per year; this amount does
not include tickets issued by the national police forces, or outside urban areas; about 15%
of non-tax revenues of municipalities comes from this source (source: our elaboration from
municipal budgets). A further peculiarity makes our data quite unique: municipal budgets
report both the cash-based and the accrual-based figures, allowing to distinguishing (for ex-
ample) between mayors issuing fewer fines or collecting less effectively. Data from municipal
budgets show that about 75% of accrued traffic-fine revenues are ever cashed in. The remain-
ing quarter is not collected for a variety of reasons: fines resulting from traffic-enforcement
cameras need to be notified within a given time frame to be valid, appeals are so frequent
(and the full number of them is unknown) that municipalities choose not to show up in Court
to defend each (small) claim1, municipalities may more generically be inefficient or ineffective
in collecting (e.g. in case the car owner is not to be found, has no funds or just does not pay);
anecdotally, it is also known that the central-government collection agency (Equitalia)—to
which most municipalities entrust the collection of unpaid claims—is less efficient when col-
lecting small amounts, while is more efficient for larger unpaid sums (originated by VAT,
income or property tax evasion).
As a first instance the aim of this paper is to seek evidence on the political budget cycle
of traffic fines, exploring both their issuance and collection. Secondly, but most importantly,
through this exercise we also find evidence of a political budget cycle in the collection mech-
anism.
1In large municipalities, such as Milan, one can find also dedicated websites offering to file the appeal on
your behalf for a small fee, claiming up to 97% success rate.
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This paper contributes to a number of strands of literature. First of all, it directly relates
to the large literature on political budget cycle, started by Nordhaus (1975) and Rogoff (1990)
and reviewed extensively by Dubois (2016). This literature highlights how nearly any aspect
of public policy (expenditure levels and composition, taxation, deficit, public employment)
are affected by electoral incentives, and in particular how these incentives are affecting policy
choices more strongly when elections are closer (so in the pre-election period) or tighter (in
marginal localities, in absence of term limits).
This paper also relates to the large literature on tax evasion. In particular the literature
has highlighted how the decision to evade taxes depends on the beliefs held about the en-
forcement mechanism (see for example the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
and the review by Andreoni et al. (1998)): the decision of not paying a parking ticket (or
the decision to file a “frivolous” appeal) can be equated to the decision to evade taxes, and
related to the expectation of being chased for that payment.
Finally, this paper is also linked with a smaller number of works on traffic enforcement
and policing: the famous paper by Fisman and Miguel (2007) found that diplomats from low
social capital countries were less likely to pay traffic fines in New York; Garrett and Wagner
(2009) noted how traffic fines are used more intensely by localities with tighter budgets;
Guillamo´n et al. (2013) find evidence of a political budget cycle of police expenditure in
Spanish municipalities.
2 Institutional Background and Data
Italy is subdivided into over 8,000 municipalities, ruled by directly elected mayors (for further
institutional details see Bracco et al. (2015)). Each municipality follows its own electoral
cycle, so that each year—typically in Spring—a number of municipalities goes to elections.
Municipalities are in charge of a number of local services, including traffic management, and
have substantial powers in revenue setting. Many municipalities—the exception being the
smaller ones—have a municipal police force, which is directly dependent from the mayor,
and is in charge of traffic controls, assisting bailiffs, checking on street sellers, and patrolling
the territory. Since 1997—through a quite non-linear process, laden with legal challenges—
the task of issuing parking tickets have been extended from members of the police forces
to ad-hoc traffic wardens. In past two decades, an increasing amount of traffic enforcement
cameras have been installed; resident-permit and pay-and-display parking have become more
and more common also outside of major cities.
Municipalities’ receive grants from upper-tier governments (mainly central government)
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and also have their own sources of revenues. On average one quarter of revenues come from
fiscal sources (such as property tax, or income tax surcharges), one half from intergovern-
mental grants, and one quarter from non-tax sources (such as user charges, fees, and fines;
see Bracco et al. (2013) for details).
Our dataset comprises municipal budgets and demographic and economic variables from
1998 to 2015, and electoral data for all mayors in power in that period (i.e. for elections held
from 1994 onwards)2
As dependent variable we use figures related to traffic fines (“Municipal Police: Highway-
Code Earmarked Resources”). In particular we measure (1) accrual figure (related to issued
fines), (2) cashing of fines issued in the year, (3) the “collection index” calculated as a ratio
between (2) and (1). Our main variables of interest are a “pre-election” dummy—which takes
value 1 in the year of and before municipal elections are held—, a “marginal” dummy—which
takes value 1 if the incumbent mayor has been elected with a margin of victory smaller than
5%—and a term-limit dummy—which takes value 1 if the incumbent mayor is barred from
seeking re-election.3 These three variables are the typical variables used to isolate situations
in which electoral incentives are particularly strong (once again, see Dubois (2016)).
We add a number control variables which are generally thought to affect local public
finance outcomes: resident population (and its square), average declared taxable income, so-
cial capital (measured through turnout at European Parliament elections at the municipality
level). We also add political controls such as dummies for left- and right-wing mayors (the
residual category being unaffiliated mayors). We then include the share of revenues coming
from intergovernmental grants and taxes, to control for vertical imbalances and fiscal auton-
omy. Finally, we control for two variables, which are more closely related to the “production
function” of traffic fines: the number of city policemen (per hundred thousand inhabs.) and
the number of registered vehicles (per thousand inhabs.). Our analysis excludes municipali-
ties from Special Autonomy regions because of data availability; to exclude outliers, reporting
errors, and municipalities with no traffic enforcement personnel, we also drop the first and
last percentile of our dependent variables, and municipalities which do not show any revenue
from traffic fines. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.
2Municipal budgets (including data on number of fines issued and number of city policemen) and electoral
data are made public by the Interior Ministry. Demographic data is provided by the Italian statistical office
ISTAT. Data on taxable income is provided by the Finance Ministry. Data on number of registered vehicles
is provided by ACI (Automobile Club d’Italia).
3Mayors in Italy are subject to a two (consecutive) term limit.
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3 Empirical Strategy and Results
We perform the following OLS regression, and show the results in Tables 2-3.
The specification can be written as:
yit = α + βPBCit + γXit + pp + τt + εit (1)
where y is in turn the amount of fines issued, the amount of fines cashed in and a “collection
index”, calculated as the ratio between cashed and issued for municipality i in year t. We
focus on the coefficient β, i.e. the effect of electoral incentives on traffic fines figures. In
our main table (Table 2), we show the results of regressions in which PBC is a pre-election
dummy, which takes value one in the year of the election and the year before that. We expect
the effect of PBC for each of the three dependent variables. We also include a battery of
controls (as spelled out in the previous section), province and year fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
The results confirm our hypothesis: all three of our political budget cycle variables in
Table 2 have the expected negative sign.
We cannot say if mayors issue fewer fines in the pre-election period, albeit the point
estimate is negative (Column 1). We can instead state that mayors collect on average 18
Eurocent less per capita (Column 2), and exhibit a collection index which is 1.1% smaller.
Our control variables also give us interesting results, even if the presence of fixed effects
and the fact that our regressions treats equally larger and smaller localities call for caution
in the interpretation. Fines are used more intensely by larger and richer municipalities, mu-
nicipalities receiving fewer grants, and raising fewer taxes.4 Social capital is non significant,
but as we include province fixed effects, this is not particularly surprising.
These results are qualitatively confirmed using two alternative measures of PBC, shown
in Table 3: dummies for mayors elected with a small margin (Columns 1, 3, 5), and term-
limit dummies (Columns 2, 4, 6). The expectation is that the point estimates are negative
for marginally elected mayors and positive for mayors subject to a term limit.
Mayors who have been elected with a small margin issue on average 89 Eurocent less
in fines, and collect on average 52 Eurocent less. The collection index is about 1% smaller
(albeit we can state this with only 90% confidence). The effect of term limit is positive, as
expected, but fails to be significant at conventional levels.
4We are aware that taxes and traffic fines may be decided simultaneously by local governments. Our
results are qualitatively unchanged if share of grants and taxes are omitted from the regressions. These
results are available upon request.
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These results are robust to tweaking of the definition of the first two PBC variables, e.g.
defining as the pre-election dummy as only to do with the year of elections, or changing the
definition of “marginal” as mayors elected with less that 10% (as opposed to 5%) margin
(available upon request).
All in all, we have strong and robust evidence that the political budget cycle is very
present in Italian municipalities, with mayors at the end of their term “slowing down” both
the issuance, collection and collection rate of traffic fines. We have suggestive evidence that
a similar dynamic happens with mayors elected with a small margin and (with opposite sign)
mayors who are not seeking re-election.
Most importantly, though, we have shown that electoral incentives affect not only policy
setting, but also policy enforcement, and more specifically revenue collection. The enforce-
ment and collection mechanism needs to be fully included into political economy models, if
one wants to uncover all potential sources of manipulation.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Tickets: Issued 10.808 18.09 60477
Tickets: Cashed 7.086 12.577 60477
Tickets: Index 0.727 0.313 60477
Marginal 0.16 0.366 60477
Pre-election 0.421 0.494 60477
Term limit 0.309 0.462 60477
Population, k 9.508 33.042 60477
Population, sq. 1182.156 30144.406 60477
Taxable income, pc. 16.676 4.244 51262
Social capital 72.602 11.049 60441
Left-wing 0.213 0.409 60477
Right-wing 0.125 0.33 60477
Grants, share 53.15 17.653 56855
Tax revenues, share 25.503 17.381 56855
Munic. Policemen per 100k inahbs. 0.01 0.237 57794
Vehicles per thousand inhabs. 596.422 74.235 59825
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Pre-election -0.108 -0.184** -0.011***
(0.122) (0.082) (0.002)
Population, k 0.132*** 0.077*** -0.000
(0.016) (0.011) (0.000)
Population, sq. -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Social capital -0.033 -0.027* -0.000
(0.023) (0.015) (0.000)
Taxable income, pc. 0.838*** 0.630*** -0.003**
(0.113) (0.076) (0.001)
Left-wing -0.362 0.002 -0.004
(0.400) (0.276) (0.006)
Right-wing 0.707 0.449 -0.015**
(0.450) (0.296) (0.007)
Grants, share -0.237*** -0.144*** 0.000
(0.019) (0.012) (0.000)
Tax revenues, share -0.263*** -0.160*** 0.001***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.000)
Munic. Policemen 0.423 0.276 0.003
(0.504) (0.288) (0.003)
Vehicles 0.001 -0.002 -0.000**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant 17.299*** 11.113*** 0.883***
(3.016) (1.898) (0.040)
N 44735 43179 43287
r2 0.158 0.161 0.045
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Note: Panel data with province and year fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality levels.
All regressions include controls.
Table 3: Effect of Electoral Incentives on Issuance and Collection of Traffic Fines (Marginal
and Term limit dummies).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Issued Cashed Index
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Marginal -0.891*** -0.520** -0.009*
(0.325) (0.221) (0.005)
Term limit 0.211 0.095 0.002
(0.233) (0.159) (0.004)
N 44735 44735 43179 43179 43287 43287
r2 0.158 0.158 0.161 0.161 0.045 0.045
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Note: Panel data with province and year fixed effects. Standard errors clus-
tered at the municipality levels. All regressions include controls.
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